The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink AboutVI (D) Discussion/Action re: Senior Program (OV 65)To: I+Yom: Date: Re: City of Ocoee 150 N. Lakeshore Drive Ocoee, Florida 34761-2258 (407) 656-2322 FAX (407) 656-5725 MEMORANDUM The Honorable Mayor and City Commission Jean Grafton, City Clerk August 14, 1996 Senior Program Agenda Item AGENDA 8-20-96 j l Item VI D Jean Grafton City Clerk Please bring your Senior Program (OV 65) packet information with you for this item. "PRIDE OF WEST ORANGE" N Ocoee Q v 0 F GOOD TO: FROM: DATE: RE: AGENDA 3-19-96 "CENTER OF GOOD LIVING - PRIDE OF WEST ORANGE" Item VI B .. ova a .r.w�ccwcirt COMMISSIONERS CITYOF COE� RUSTY JOHNSON ISCOTT ANDERSON 150 N. LAKESHORE DRIVE SCOTT A. GLASS OCOEE, FLORIDA 34761-2258 JIM GLEASON (407) 656-2322 CI'[Y MANAGER ELLIS SHAPIRO MEMORANDUM 8-1.3-96 The Honorable Mayor and Board of City Commissioners cc: Vandergrift Johnson Ellis Shapiro, City Manager Anderson Glass March 13,1996 Gleason OVER 65 COMMITTEE ShapiroHorton Pursuant to your direction, the Over 65 Committee was appointed by you and has met for the past several months to review the current Over 65 Program and to make recommendations to you regarding the continuance of the program in the future. Upon the organization of this committee and selection of a chairman, the Over 65 Committee selected Michael Hammond to be their attorney for the purposes of reviewing the legality of the current program. Mr. Hammond is present for any questions Jou may have. Attached for your review is a copy of his comprehensive report to the Committee. As a result of his report, the Committee met on several occasions and began asking questions regarding the demographics of the people in our community over the age of 65. Attached is a report by Senior Planner Abra Horne regarding the numbers she found. She is also present to answer any questions .you may have. After much discussion, the Over 65 Committee unanimously came up with the following recommendation: Amy bona fide resident of the City of Ocoee age 65 and over whose personal andlor household annual income is at 150% of poverhj level rounded to nearest $100.00 shall be eligible for a monthly per household benefit of a maximum of 10,000 gallons of free water and solid waste pick up. T7re poverty level income shall be determined Inj an outside agency to be selected Inj City Commission. Chairman Dan Murphy_ is also present tonight and would like to say a few words to you and answer any questions you may have. ES:fdg Attachments (2) Respectfully Submitted, i STEVEN A RISSMAN RICHARD H. WEISBERG ROBERT C. BARRETT JENNINGS L, HURT III ROBERT A. DONAHUE JOHN E MCLAIN III RICHARD S. WOMBLE RANDALLM BOLINGER JOHN P DALY HILLAREY A. MCCALL STACIE B. GREENE ADMINISTRATOR W SCOTT PETERSON WALTER G. BENJAMIN ROBERT S.BENNETT DOUGL ASW BOND THOMAS T CLIFFORD KATHLEEN S CUMMING VANCE R DAWSON JOSEPH T FARRELL JILL K FOLE" RISSMAN. WEISBERG, BARRETT, DONAHUE S: McLAIN, P A. ATTORNEYS AT LAW 201 EAST PINE STREET 15TH FLOOR ORLANDO. FLORIDA 32901 TELEPHONE 140718-19-0120 TELECOP-ER 14071 841.9726 BARNETT PLAZA 101 EAST KENNEDY BOULEVARD SUITE 1900 7A, MPA FLO171OA 33602 TELEPHONE 18131221-3114 TELECOPIER 18131 221.3C33 - 9 4 1$1 -� HU R -T, CITRUS FINANCIAL CEN TER 1717 INDIAN RIVER BOULEVARD SUITE 201 'JERO BEACH. FLOPIDA 32960 TELEPHONE 14071 569-7960 TELECOPIER 14071569-4513 PLEASE REPLY To: ORLANDO February 12, 9996 Daniel R. Murphv, Esc. Zimmerman, Shufiieid, Kiser & Sutcliffe Landmark Cen-er One, Suite 6600 315 East Robinson Street P.O. Box 3000 Orlando, FL 32802-3000 Re: City of Ocoee, Senior Program Our File No. 1009-29774 Dear Mr. Murphy: MICHAELJ. FURBUSH THEODORE N. GOLDSTEIN HUNTER A. HALL MICHAEL V. HAM MOND KELLY HYDE HANS KENNON ROBERT A. KINGSFORD LISA E. tAZAN RAYMOND A LOPEZ TORBEN S. MAOSON III RICHARD B. MANGAN JR. THOMAS H. MCOONALO MARY GANNON-MCMURRY DAVID B. MOFFETT VINCENT R. PAWLOWSKI DANIEL M POLLACK GREGORY O. PRYSOCK RONALD T. RIDER RANDY E. SCHIMMELPFENNIG RICHARD A SIMON MARK SPANGLER WARREN K SPONSLER DIANE L. SUDIA KRISTIN SWANSON-MA(:E PAUL T T£PLIZZESF. F PAUL TIPTON GAUL L WESTCOTT ART C YOUNG I have now had the opportunity to complete my analysis of the City of Ocoee Senior Program and conduct the necessary legal research in order to offer my opinions as requested by the Senior Program Committee at its regular meeting on November 27, 1995. Although this program presents rather complicated fact specific issues of constitutional law, I will do my best to present the issues and analysis in layman's terms in order to avoid confusion. The opinions offered in this letter are based on my understanding of the facts as presented by the Senior Program Committee, the wording of the senior program resolution itself, and Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 2 the current status of the law as it relates to each of the issues presented by the ordinance. This letter will outline my initial thoughts and observations, provide legal analysis of the issues, and provide recommendations for future action to be taken by the committee. FACTUAL OVERVIEW The City of Ocoee Senior Program provides for certain specific eligibility requirements before a citizen of Ocoee can partake in the program. In addition, the program provides certain specific benefits once an individual has met the eligibility requirements. Specifically, a citizen of -Ocoee is eligible for participation in the Senior Program if that individual (1.) has resided in the city limits of Ocoee for ten years or more; (2) is the owner and occupant of his/her home within the city limits of Ocoee; (3 ) -is at least'65 years of age or, in the alternative, 62 years of age and receiving social security benefits; and ;4) has submitted an anolication for benefits to the City and that application has been approved. The benefits provided by the Senior Program include (1) !0,000 gallons of water per month without charge; (2) garbage/trasii pickup service provided by -he Cite without charge; and (3) a refund of City of Ocoee ad valorem property taxes u_n.to a maximum of $100 per year. The Senior Program as described above presents several legal issues under the United States Constitution. Specifically, the eligibility requirements create classifications based on a durational residency requirement within the city limits of Ocoee, a property ownership requirement, and an age requirement. Each of these classifications would be scrutinized under the 'United States Constitution based on an equal protection analysis. Generally, equal _protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a state or any political subdivision of a state must treat similarly situated persons within_ its jurisdiction in an equal manner.- This concept will be developed further in the legal analysis provided below. In addition, the benefits conferred by the Senior Program present at least one issue under the Florida Constitution. Specifically, Article VII, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution requires that ad valorem property taxes levied by a political subdivision of the state must be at a uniform rate within the taxing unit, in this case the City of Ocoee. This letter will analyze each of the issues identified above separately for the committee's full consideration. Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 3 LEGAL ANALYSIS UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY CLASSIFICATION The United States Supreme Court first analyzed the constitutionality of durational residency requirements in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of several state statutes in Connecticut, the District of Columbia; and Pennsylvania. Each of those statutes required that an individual must have resided in the jurisdiction in question for at least one year before that individual would be eligible to receive welfare benefits. According to the Supreme Court, the statutes at issue created: two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and other necessities of life. Td. at 627_ After a lengthy discussion and analysis by the court of the various reasons put forward by the states to justify their classification; the Supreme Court determined that the reasons were not sufficient. The specific justifications for the statutes offered by the states included (1) facilitating the planning of the welfare budget; (2) providing an objective test of residency; (3) minimizing the opportunity for recipients to receive fraudulent payments; and (4) encouraging early entry of new residents into the labor force. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the legitimacy of each of these justifications then noted: The waiting period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from state to state or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 4 any classification would serve to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional. Id. at 634 In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court essentially established that the analysis of any durational residency requirement imposed by a political subdivision of the state would be subjected to what is known as "strict scrutiny" in equal protection analysis. If a governmental regulation does not affect a "suspect class" or infringe on a "fundamental" constitutional right a court will analyze it' under the "rational basis" test. Under the rational basis test a classification imposed by a. statute will be uvheld if the classification is rationally related to any legitimate state interest. However, under the strict scrutiny analysis a classification imposed by a political subdivision of a state will be struck down unless that political subdivision c_ - show that the classification is the least res_tri ctive means of accc)mnlishina a comrelli nc state interest. ! This is the most - difficult level of constitutional scrutinv to overcome and the Supreme Court virtually never determines that a statute meets this' test. This strict scrutiny analysis applies to any statute that affects the rights of a "suspect class," such as race or national origin, or that -affects the exercise of a "fundamental" constitutional right, such as the right to interstate travel at issue in Shapiro. However, in spite of the difficulty that a governmental entity has in overcoming this level of scrutiny the Supreme Court opened a small window of opportunity with its language in the Shapiro case. Specifically, the Supreme Court placed importance on the nature of the benefit withheld or conferred based on the classification at issue. As indicated in the quoted passage above, the Court believed it was significant that the classification made it more difficult for a family to obtain "the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and other necessities of life." Id. at 627. In subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the same issue the Court has expanded on this "penalty" analysis and viewed the nature of the benefit conferred to withheld as significant. For example, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricona County, 415 U.S. 238 (1974), the Supreme Court was called upon to analyze the constitutionality of a durational residency requirement imposed by Maricopa County, Arizona, before residents of that county could take part in free medical benefits provided by the county. After acknowledging that the county ordinance at issue affected the Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 5 fundamental right of interstate travel, thereby triggering strict scrutiny analysis, the Maricopa County court stated: Although any durational residence requirement impinges tO some extent on the right to travel, the court in Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitu- tional. The court's holding was conditioned by the caveat that some "waiting period or residence requirements . may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitu- tional right of interstate travel." The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling state interest test was not made clear. Tcd. at 256-57 (citations omitted). After acknowledging this unanswered question from Shani ro, the Maricopa County court stated: Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shaniro penalty analysis, it is at least clear: that medical care is as much "a basic necessity of life" to an indigent as welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have Often been viewed as being of greater. constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements. id. at 259 (citations omitted). although the Supreme Court itself has not more fully analyzed the nature of the benefits conferred or withheld by a regulation under the "penalty" analysis first introduced in Shapiro, federal circuit courts of appeal and United States district courts have picked up on this theme.and expanded it somewhat. The most noted examples of the expansion of tills theory come from decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. For example, in Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the constitu- ti enali ty of a Nevada law that based the conferring of cost-cf- living increases for workers' compensation benefits on a classification of residents versus nonresidents. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the residency requirement at issue in that case was not durational in nature, Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 6 that is the classification did not require that the recipient of the benefit must have resided in the jurisdiction for a specific period of time but only that the recipient must actually reside in the jurisdiction, the case nonetheless provides further understand- ing of the "penalty" analysis discussed above. Specifically, the Fisher court stated: A further distinction between the cases invalidating durational residency classifications and the facts of the instant case is in the nature of the benefit denied. In Shapiro the claim was for subsistence welfare; in Dunn rv. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 .(1972)] the denial was of the fundamental riaht to vote; and in Maricona County, the injury was the loss of the riaht to free nonemeraencv medical treatment. The court in Maricona County emphasized that the fundamental character cf the claims asserted in the three cases was a factor in finding that the right to travel had been penalized. Ic:_ at 635 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' then proceeded to quote the language from Maricoma Count v that highlighted the importance of the specific benefit conferred in that case, which was welfare benefits. After making this observation the Fisher court stated further: The benefit in question here is a supplemental payment for spousal disability. Elicribilitv for the benefit is not based upon financial_ need. We cannot say that such benefits have a necessity or urgency as great as the benefits in Shapiro or Maricona County. The Supreme Court has specifically held that where eligibility for benefits is not based on financial need, termination of the benefit does not implicate the same constitutional concerns that denial of the benefit for basic subsistence does. Id. at 636 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). After making this observation from the Supreme Court's decision_ in Matthews, the Fisher court determined that the Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 7 classification at issue in that case was not unconstitutional, in part because it was not a durational residence requirement, but also because of the fact that the eligibility for the benefit conferred was not based upon need and was, therefore, arguably not a benefit providing for the "basic necessities of life." Essentially, the Fisher court determined, in part, that because the benefit at issue in that case did not rise to the same level as the benefits at issue in Shapiro and Maricooa County, the classification at issue in Fisher should not trigger the application of strict scrutiny and, under the rational basis test, the classification passed constitutional muster. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also reached a similar conclusion in Hawaii Boating Association v. State of Hawaii, 651 F.2d 66I (9th Cir. 1-981) . In Hawaii Boating Association, the court was called upon to determine whether a durational residency requirement for the conferring of low coast boat mooring rates implicated the constitutional fundamental right to travel thereby triggering strict scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first acknowledged the standard set in the Shapiro line of cases. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit observed that "the Court held, in Dunn v. Blumstein and. Memorial Hospital v. Maricona County that durational residency requirements which involved deprivations of the right to vote and free nonemergency medical care triggered strict scrutiny. Id. at 664 (citations omitted). After having done this, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went on to state: In Mariccna County, however, the Court noted that "the amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling state interest test [has] not been made clear. " In Fisher v. Reiser we noted the importance of the "nature of the benefit denied." In fact, Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in Fisher, after reviewing the right to travel cases, commented that "the court [has] indicated that the `penalty` required to invoke strict scrutiny involves a genuinely significant deprivation, such as a denial of the basic necessities of life, (as in Shapiro), or the denial of a `fundamental political right, (as in Dunn)." Id. at 664-65. After maks ng these observations the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically acknowledged that the district court judge in Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 8 the same case below had found that the strict scrutiny analysis did not apply to the statute at issue because the durational residency requirement for preferential rates for mooring privileges at recreational boat harbors was not a sicmificant penalty on the right to travel.. The court then stated: We agree with the district judge that the "deprivation" involved in this case - the failure to provide a berth in a recreational boat harbor at the same rate as a resident - does not operate as sicmificant "penalty" on the right to travel. Id. at 665. Based on all of the cases outlined above, it is my opinion that any court reviewing the constitutionality of the Ocoee Senior Program based on an equal protection analysis would most likely begin with a presumption that the strict scrutiny analysts applies in this case. This is true because the Senior Program imposes a durational residency .requirement, which under the Shapiro line of cases impinges on the fundamental right to interstate travel. Nevertheless, having ac::nowledged this, it is also rry opinion that the nature of the benefit analysis first acknowledged in Shapiro and expanded on in the cases reviewed above provides a significant "window of opportunity" within which the City of Ocoee can argue that the nature of the benefit conferred by the Senior Program is significantly different than the nature of the benefit conferred or withheld in Shapiro and Maric=a Countv. This is particularly true given the fact that the Senior Program does not have as one of its requirements a need -based selection process. This fact is particularly significant under the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analysis in Fisher v. Reiser, which held that the classification at issue did not infringe on the fundamental right to travel. Finally, having said all this, it is significant to note that there is at least one case in Florida that deals with these specific issues. In Sanchez v. Pinaree, 494 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Fla. 1980), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida was called upon to determine whether the durational residency requirements of the Florida Community Care for the Elderly Act was unconstitutional because it denied elderly persons otherwise eligible for the benefits under the act equal protection of the laws and impinged upon their fundamental constitutional right to interstate travel. Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 9 The Sanchez case involved a Florida state statute that authorized the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to subsidize part or all of. the costs of housing, food, clothes, medical services, and incidentals for eligible elderly persons who were being provided care at home. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ultimately determined that the statute at issue was unconstitutional after it determined that the statute implicated the fundamental right to travel and it applied the strict scrutiny analysis. However, it is also important to note that in the course of its analysis the district court acknowledged the "penalty" analysis introduced by Shapiro and acknowledged in Maricona County. The Sanchez court specifically stated that "here, the sought after benefits are closely akin to medical care and, in any event, qualif;r as a form of state welfare assistance. Thus, under either ShaT)iro or Maricona County, the Florida durational res idercv requirement is constitutionally infirm." Id. at 71. The Sanchez court also observed that the defendant's failure to attempt to demonstra_-e any state interest in that case further supported its conclusion. 2. AGE CLASSIFICATION It is a longstanding rule of constitutional law that a classification based on age will not trigger strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause because age is neither a "suspect classification" nor does a classification based on age implicate a fundamental right. The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged this fact in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Muraia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), and has reaffirmed this position as recently as 1991 in Gregory v. Ashcroft, U.S. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (199!). Because any classification based on age does not trigger strict scrutiny, any court reviewing such a classification would make its determination based on the rational basis test. In other words, the court would uphold the classification if the City of Ocoee could show that there is any rational basis for the classification and that the classification is intended to meet a legitimate governmental end. In my opinion, it is very likely that any court reviewing the age classification at issue in the Senior Program would find that the classification is constitutional. Daniel R. Murphy, Esc. February 12, 1996 Page 10 3. OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION There is very little cash law in the federal courts dealing with the nature of classifications based on property, ownership. The only case I was able to locate dealing with this issue is from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. Specifically, in Hetherton v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 82 (D. Del. 1980), the District Court for the District of Delaware was asked to determine the constitutionality of a statute that required two real property owners to vouch for the identify of an individual before that individual could purchase a firearm in the State of Delaware. The Hetherton court first acknowledged that classifications based on property, do -not trigger strict scrutiny analysis. However, the court also noted that recent developments in equal protection law have indicated a possibility of some intermediate level of scrutiny that requires a statute to be "substantially" related to a "important" state interest. Nevertheless, after acknowledging the possibility of this intermediate level of review the court declined to apply that test and, instead, determined that the classification at issue bore no rational relationship to ever_ the legitimate state purose of ensuri png that firearms are not sold to criminals. Specifically, the court reasoned that reauir.r_g property owners to vouch for individuals before they can purchase firearms is irrational because any number of qualified upstanding citizens who did not own property could just as easily vouch for individuals wishing to purchase firearms. Unfortunately, this case does not provide.a great deal of guidance in the situation we are presently considering because it involves such different facts. Nevertheless, it is important to note the possibility that a court would apply this intermediate level of scrutiny when analyzing the property classification at issue in the City of Ocoee Senior Program. In my opinion, if a court applied the rational basis test to the property classification in the City of Ocoee Senior Program it is very likely that it would determine that there is a rational relationship between the classification and the legitimate state purpose, which is to benefit elderly citizens of the city that are stable property owners. FLORIDA CONSTITII'I'IONAL ISSUES As indicated above, the City of Ocoee Senior Program presents at least one Florida constitutional issue. Specifically, one of Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 11 the benefits of the program is a refund of City of Ocoee ad valorem property taxes up to a maximum of $100 per year. I have not been able to find any cases or other legal authority that would in any way change the analysis of the City Attorney provided in his April 14, 1995 memorandum to the City Commissioners. Specifically, Article VII, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution clearly requires that all ad valorem property taxes within any jurisdiction must be levied at a uniform rate. Essentially, by providing an ad valorem property tax rebate to only certain individuals, the City has established a nonuniform property tax rate within its jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of the Florida Constitution. In fact, as indicated in the City Attorney's memorandum mentioned above, the Florida Supreme Court has dealt with this very issue. In Archer v. Marshall, 355 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of a state statute that provided for rental rebates in the same amount as ad valorem property taxes levied on property leased by individuals from the S=ate. The Supreme Court stated: We agree with the trial court that the purpose and effect of this special act is to create an indirect exemption from taxation on property not authorized by the State constitution., and therefore find it unnecessary to address the. additional grounds set forth by the trial court to support its conclusion. Id. at 783. Essentially, the Supreme Court determined that any mechanism employed by a governmental entity that provides for a nonuniform rate of ad valorem property tax violates Article VII, Section 2, of the Florida State Constitution, which specifically requires that all property taxes in a given jurisdiction be levied at a uniform rate. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the analysis provided above, some of the conclusions and recommendations that I will offer are arrived at more easily than others. For example, it seems fairly clear from the research that the Senior Program should definitely be modified to eliminate the. benefit of the $100 ad valorem property tax rebate. This Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 1996 Page 12 provision specifically violates a clause of the Florida Constitution and could not be defended under any circumstances in the event that someone were to sue the City in an attempt to invalidate that portion of the program. In contrast, the age classification and the property ownership classification established by the program would very likely pass constitutional muster and, in my opinion, should not require any modification based on the present state of the law. The durational residency requirement established by the program presents the most difficult issue for determination by the committee. As indicated in my legal analysis above, I believe it is almost certain that any court called upon to review the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement would begin with the presumption that strict scrutiny applies because the durational residency requirement implicates the fundamental constitutional right to interstate travel. Having said this, also acknowledge that there is at least the one "window n" opportunity" to defend the durational residency requirement based on the nature of the benefit conferred or withheld. Specifically, the Senior Program provides for two specific things in addition to the property tax rebate. Those things are 10,000 gallons of water per month at no charge and garbage/trash pickup at no charge. In my opinion, it is arguable that these benefits conferred on the distinct durational residence class are distinguishable from the benefits conferred or withheld based on the classifications in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricona County. However, having said this, it is important to remind the committee that this "nature of the benefit" argument is a very fluid and uncertain theory of constitutional law. Because constitutional law is so complicated and fact specific it is impossible to determine how any court would rule if an individual were to sue the City in an attempt to challenge the validity of this statute. Accordingly, the committee should know that if it makes a determination to retain any durational residency classification in the program, it is likely that some litigation would develop at some point in the future, even if the City were able to demonstrate during the course of that litigation that the classification is not constitutionally suspect. I trust this letter has been helpful in your determination of the issues presented to you by the City Commission. Although my provision of this opinion technically fulfills the responsibilities for which the committee hired me, I would certainly be available for any additional consultation or research that the committee felt Daniel R. Murphy, Esq. February 12, 19 9 6 Page 13 was necessary in order to make its final recommendation to the City Commission. Thank you very much for the opportunity to work with you. Sincerely, Michael V. Hammond MVH/ljc CC: Senior Program Committee To: Ellis Shapiro, City Manager Through: Russell B. Wagner, AICP, Director of Planning From: Abra Elise Home, Senior Planner Subject: Senior Program Committee Date: March 8, 1996 File: MFP-96-047 This memorandum responds to the attached February 26, 1996 request for information from the Senior Program Committee. The Committee requested the number of persons who would qualify for a program which provided 10,000 gallons of potable water and solid waste service per month based upon the age, income/poverty status, and Social Security status. I researched the available data and determined that some of the information is not collected in the manner requested. Most significantly, the Social Security Administration is the only organization which collects data for persons between the ages of 62 and 64. All other data sources collect information based upon either five or ten year increments. The Committee request for an estimate of the number of potential Senior Program recipients based upon poverty status was also difficult to obtain. I have attached the 1990, 1994, and 1995 poverty levels and calculated the percentages of the Poverty Levels using the 1990 and 1995 thresholds on the attached "Senior Program Committee Data" sheet. The attached Tables 178 and .179 of the 1990 Census estimate the poverty status of selected groups; however, the information does not cross-reference the three requested variables: age, persons per household, and household income. At the bottom of Table 178, all persons living in Ocoee in 1990 and living below 200% of the poverty level are estimated to be 3,080. Since persons over 65 in the City in 1990 represented 9.3% of the general population (1, 188), we could extrapolate that there were 286 persons over 65 living below 200% of the poverty threshold at that time. When this figure is compared to the estimate that 6.65% of the 1990 65} population lived below the poverty level (79) and the total of persons 65+ whose income status was evaluated (445), then the extrapolation appears to be acceptable. Accordingly, this extrapolation is projected through the year 2010 on the attached "Senior Program Committee Data Sheet." I am less confident in the projections shown for persons over 65 living below the 200% poverty level than I am in the projections for persons over 65 living below the poverty level because the Census Bureau collects data for the second figure. Below, the "Requested Information" Table outlines the data requested by the Committee which was available either directly or by extrapolation. The Social Security Administration data was used to determine the number of program recipients rather than Census data because I found that the 1990 Census Data for Retired Income Households and Social Security Income Households included a variety of other program recipients, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Disability Income Recipients (refer to attached page B-16). I included 1990 Census data and extrapolations as an indicator of accuracy on the "Senior Program Committee Data" sheet. The Table below includes three Senior Program Cost Estimates. Each program would benefit Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) Recipients. The first program would also benefit people who are 65 and living below the poverty threshold whereas the second program includes persons who are 65 and living below the 200% threshold. Persons receiving. General Social Security benefits may also be receiving other pensions or income and are not necessarily "in need." However, I included a third program which added General Social Security Recipients to Program #12. The resulting Costs associated with the three suggested programs are totaled at the bottom of the Table below. IN Page 2 March 8, 1996 Requested Information Annual Expenditures to Age: Eligible Persons Persons Per Benefit per provide 10,000 gallons & Household* Household Per solid waste pick-up to Month eligible households Persons between 62-64 unknown 1.65 $28.74 $0.00 living below the 150% poverty level (1995) Persons between 62-64 unknown 1.65 $28.74 $0.00 living below the 175°x6 poverty level (1995) Persons between 62-64 unknown 1.65 $,28.74 $0.00 living below the 200% poverty level (1995) Persons between 62-64 unknown 1.65 $28,74 S0.0C Supplemental Social I Security Income (1995) Persons over 65 living unknown 1.65 $28.74 $0.00 below the ISO% poverty level (1995) I Persons over 65 living unknown 1.65 $28.74 $0.00 below the 175% poverty level (1995) Persons over age 65 - 58 1.65 $28.74 $12,123.05 Supplemental Social Security Income (1995) Below Poverty Level 156 1.65 $28.74 532,606.84 Over 65 Regardless of Social Security (1995) Persons over 65 living 565 1.65 $28.74 $118,095.27 below the 200% poverty level (1995). Retired Persons 968 1.65 $28.74 $202,329.60 Receiving General Social Security (1995) [GSS]:' Program fit Total Cost (1995) [SSI plus 100% Poverty]: $44,729.89 Program 42 Total Cost (1995) [SSI plus 200% Poverty]: $130,218.33 Program ;#,3 Total Cost (1995) [SSI plus 200% Poverty plus GSSJ: $332,547.93 ' = This Social Security Prooram includes persons 62+ who have retired with work credits and it is not related to "need." ■ TO: Ellis Shapiro, City Manager FROM: Marian Green, Deputy City Clerk�,Y� DATE: February 26, 1996 RE: SENIOR PROGRAM COMMITTEE - NEXT MEETING Me Committee has scheduled their next meeting for Monday, March 4th at 6:00 p.m. i; information they are requesting can be provided by that time. They are considering a new program based or. need and wish to know the estimated aumber who would qualify and the costs for a program based on following criteria: Aae: 65 and over/62+ and on Social Security Benefits: Water at 10,000 aSolid Waste zo Income: 150% of poverty level, and 175% of poverty level, and 200% of poverty level Dan Murphy can be reached at his office at 425-7010 all day tomorrow (Tuesday) if you wish to speak with him. Senior Program Committee Data 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2010 (population projections based upon an extrapolation of recent population trends) Population 12778 13775 15107 16418 17489 18471 25086 34370 47090 change 7.24% 8.82% 7.99% 6.12% 5.32% 6.10% 6.10% 6.10% Est. Sr. Citizens 1188 1281 1405 1527 1626 2346 3387 4468 6122 (age 65+) ' 9.30% 9.30% 9,30% 9,30% 12.70% 13.50% 13.00% 13.00% Total below 200% PL 3080 3320 3641 3957 4215 4452 6046 8283 _ 11349 Est. 65+ below 200% PL 286 309 339 368 392 565 816 1077 1475 (data supplied by Social Security Administration) SSI Recip 65+ 38 40 58 84 111 152 Total SSI 198 210 222 301 412 565 Retd. Soc. Sec. 968 1030 1088 1478 2024 2774 Total Soc. Sec. '1734 1847 1951 2649 3629 4973 (projections based upon 1990 Census data) Total Households 4146 4472 4905 5331 5678 5997 8145 11159 '15289 SSI Households 762 823 902 981 1045 1103 1499 2053 2813 Ret. Inc. HH 575 617 677 736 784 828 1124 1540 2110 (projections based upon poverty thresholds used for the 1990 Census) (projections based upon 1995 poverty thresholds) 100.00% 150.00% 175.00% 200.00% 100.00% 150.00% 175.00% 200.00% 1 pers. HH 65+ in poverty $5,947 $8,921 $10,407 $11,894 $7,309 $10,964 $12,791 $14,618 2 pers. HH 65+ in poverty $7,501 $11,252 $13,127 $15,002 $9,221 $13,832 $16,137 $18,442 Persons Poverty 65+ .79 85 93 102 108 156 225 297 407 All Persons 65+ 847 909 997 1084 1154 1219 1656 2.268 3108 Persons 65+ at 100% Poverty or SSI Suggested Recipient Households 85 90 130 188 247 339 Annual City Expenditure $29,263 $30,935 $44,730 $64,587 $85,279 $116,841 Persons 65+ at 200% Poverty or SSI Suggested Recipient Households 246 262 378 546 720 986 Annual City Expenditure $84,861 $90,296 $130,218 $188,116 $248,314 $340,073 We cannot determine persons 62+ because data is not collected that way except for by the SSA. Average household size of 9.65 persons is based upon the average household size of persons 65 ► using 1990 Census data. The above data was aggregated by the Ocoee Planning Department. It represents a variety of sources including data from the Social Security Administration and the 1990 Census. Figures were compared to the Ocoee Comprehensive Plan for accuracy. 3/6/96 uj ut 96 1J: i, 4WA 6-13Y � !uy ii ... F. R wage or salary income and net income from farm and nonfarm self-employment. "Earnings" represent the amount of income received regularly before deductions for per- sonal income taxes, Social Security, bond purchases, union dues, medicare deductions. etc. Receipts from the following sources -are not included as income: money received from the sale of property (unless the recipient was engaged in the business of selling such property); the value of income 'In kind" from food stamps, public housing subsidies, medical care, employer contribu- tions for persons, etc.; withdrawal of bank deposits; money borrowed; tax refunds; exchange of money between rela- tives living in the same household; gifts and lump -sum inheritances, insurance payments, and other types of lump -sum receipts. Income Type In 1989 The eight types of income reported in the census are defined as follows: 1. Wage or Salary Income—includes total money earn- ings received for work performed as an employee during the calendar year 1989. It includes wages, salary, Armed Forces pay, commissions, tips, piece - rate payments, and cash bonuses earned- before deductions were made for taxes, bonds, pensions, union dues, etc. 2 Nonfarm✓ Self-Employawnt /ncome—Includes net money income (gross receipts minus expenses) from one's own business, professional enterprise, or partnership. Gross receipts include the value of all goods sold and services rendered. Expenses includes costs of goods purchased. rent, heat, light, power, depreciation charge% wages and salaries paid, business taxes (not personal income taxes), etc. 3_ Feint Self-Emplayment income --includes net money income (gross receipts minus operating expenses) from the operation of a farm by a person on his or her own account, as an owner, renter, or sharecropper. Gross receipts include the value of all products sold, government farm programs. money received from the rental of farm equipment to others, and incidental receipts' -from the sale of wood, sand, gravel, etc. Operating expenses include cost of feed, fertilizer, seed, and other farming supplies, cash wages paid to farmhands, depreciation charges, cash rent, interest on farm mortgages, farm building repairs, farm taxes (not State and Federal personal income taxes), etc. The value of fuel, food, or other farm products used for family living is not included as part of net Income. 4. intereSt Dividend or Net Rental Income --Includes interest on savings or bonds. dividends from stock- holdings or membership in associations, net income from rental of property to others and receipts from boarders or lodgers, net royalties, and periodic pay- ments from an estate or trust fund. oss udes Social Security pen toma and sucvivars benefits and permanent disability insurance payments made by the Social Security Administration prior to deductions for medical insur ance, and railroad retirement insurance checks frorr the U.S. Government. Medicare reimbursements ars not included. S. Public Assistance Income --includes: (1) supplemen- tary security income payments made by Federal or State welfare agencies to low income persons who are aged (65 years old or over), blind, or disabled: (2) aid to' families with dependent children, and (3) general assistance. Separate payments received for hospital or other medical care (vendor payments) are excluded from this item. 7. Retirement or Disability Income—Includes: (1) retire- ment pensions and survivor benefits from a former employer, laborunion, or Federal, State, county, or other governmental agency; (2) disability income from sources such as worker's compensation; companies or unions; Federal, State, or local government; and the U.S. military; (3) periodic receipts from annuities and insurance; and (4) regular income from IAA and KEOGH plans. 8. All Ciller Income--lndudes unemployment compen- sation, Veterans Administration (VA) payments, ali- mony and child support, contributions received period- ically from persons not living in the household, military tamily ailotments, net gambling winnings, and other kinds of periodic income other than earnings. Income of Households --includes the income of the householder and all other persons 15 years old and over iii the household, whether related to the householder or not Because many households consist of only one person, average household income is usually less than average family income. Income of Families and persons—in compiling statistics on family income, the incomes of all members 15 years old and over in each family are summed and treated as a single amount. However, for persons 15 years old and over, the total amounts of their own incomes are used. Although the income statistics covered the calendar year 1989, the characteristics of persons and the composition of families refer to the time of enumeration (April 1990). Thus, the income of the family does not include amounts received by persons who were members of the family during all or part of the calendar year 1989 if these persons no longer resided with the family at the time of enumera- tion. Yet, family income amounts reported by related persons who did not reside with the family during 1989 but who were members of the family at the time of enumera- tion numeration are included- However, the composition of most families was the same during 1989 as in April 1990. Median income --The median divides the income distribu- tion into two equal parts, one having incomes above the median and the other having incomes below the median. B-16 DEFiNI'nCNS OF SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS ;U:33 407 623 1084 E.C.I"'.R.P.C. - �1a11 I Table 178. Pov" Status ]0 1989 of Famltgs and Per,=: 1990 --Con. 104" bwd 9h 3rs9 wd wbiwl WS t- Ofi, •wtbMY. We W. tw 40ime64 M lwwa rad nopimp d n. 769 tool Placa wd Dn Sdeded Statest County S96lii63im [10,000 or _ Motu Pumas] a."aft" ow. aea siitsr 11tr/R 1>er► d1f ah **min t]J7 Qcd4 ah Oaw6 017 01w QI/ IYMq or 00rOtY9 Oh lytMtlO eh ALL GIC=X UVII.S N 1119 b 9..w4eat1ia11 beouq u+r : ....._� MqA nwM t)*7M.w u1w is Two- «..... WW411 rrnhd d.ar. ~ 3 n•+_____..____ Ir9aeeot:lw .molar m well -- _ tiolwet1c16Rr -. 949r maw kd bro w 1919._ H&Affh.•dw Mir U 9rwa -4 wt 439w t► Nane"bo * f9" Imo- ....,.__-- ro usafta w Y+99r 23 rms----_.... ..... 1Mlwicttr 62 qrt ad aw__._._�.._.... RM946600aw 1"9A wood pada- or 6y6w.�........ wi • 1)3 t)7. 96 10:30 2407 Table 139. Seiect+ed 0mvcfthstits IYIo O�1M r 46.w 9r talletf ti..Iwiq wyilf. we Ru d.13 :0•54 _. C. F. R. P. C. of Persons 60 Years and Over, by Age: 7• Atr.16.9 M mp%OW 4..w" d X. ft it %wI 1990 -Con. nu.3 P%w OW an Stlnitd slowl CIRO" Sbb&TWat [10,000 or Mort prim] 1*" "W ofm w p" 3we vaw Sew. hn u, a" Oak alta a. Ot919 a19 00r ah Ow CJ►oA.w 1te*,^ cp 01t•I9e69 e6► *%of e4 UVM ANIANG 7MtM 9...66.«r-•.. - w rn i `r_-_ 2 mn ................ �•�. x+rlsa... 5 4° IIv; s /)nw .. _.------ - .•.r."..•.tM4t".9 93 .____--_ _- _._�___._. n-- .-_u-- Wt 071 s 473 2 A" 1 ssa 574 • SM 1 Big 3 3312 .ew0ts7t 11 36ii ".•...".1_9.. v6t4r -1-9 --. -_ 245 s_- a 732 344 1 nl :0 443 A419.. 73 T9949 a16 9•.._» 9 61I 2s t a1 1s 1 3a m /`.. s ro 20 - - _ 44 154 Te 1 436 192 I YI 213 ] 2 22/.1 3i0 7 1601 71 106 106 - _ 4Y '°/ 213 - Se! - 213 - - Sit MUCITIVIK A1TAKl W frm M N M 19~4 ___..«»_... lro rlr 91a 731 ICO 1 las 4" 2 20 '3611 •1/ 2 3K wf wwr .-„--�_...« ._..r 916 1216 t1.1e.., i.+.•1..»-«.»» 5 n 62 153 174 ,es /9 1u 73 477 261 3 aM &Wa0a w' 111" 0.61919 G1d99a vvjNo1Q16___«-___. 325 ng 43A 152 795 a Ill 102 71 12 1 233 s.e. aa11t9 9.9s9at9 A'•6' ----------- - 2" Igo 3" r A" 242 3" 49 1 5a1 /wUVY►'vOgn.rryrr__�- __-__._-- 233 N 177 40 311 13 X73 440 N I ]Sil La6.r 9x1 R9A7-_«..__.__.. 071 27 1 477 '0 1 tss III 336 a w 66a 1 /11 5n 3 al 12 127 91 10 563 01U +. 1716 t^�'s .......___ IY 415 421 w 1 14 761 1 071 1056. 157 363 aa2 AU '3113 vR +� �9.....,t- foh" mp 4A9 bu 617 9010 7 ;A 1 .IT 20/ )nsome 6n 76 1 9PC 3 31a --- 19dwMe-. +'9. 9.1:x...____- 363 � 177 » "1 323 437 77 2 Ill hrs 73 �..a ... __...__. 1 40 t 61/ t m I9e 3 9731 222 302 622 2 263 19 1 .91 lis 9w. 9w r.+. _-_.».«_.._ 119 322 4.71 el 1 1176 Ila 717 1214111 199 r 133 to 120 weft w 9kior «».» 247 457 401 67 919 97 117 2" 1 064, 19tH /QISA 91.11.19 a%"" Or -0 r.1.- us 371 ♦ 1) 21 1007 31 1 323 379 3e/ • $0116 es69ta 1r cusum 9Mr __------- - Alt 724 17e 13 109 25 344 W 24 2 ! p e9dslar t 4s9" Or *Mw -_ 317 224 95 A 3Y 306 i 1 741 9 1317 56 IIKOW AMC PON" MIUS IN 1419 y Mmpbli'te*r Ieod%% M. 0644 . Y is w 7... ;.000 Len � u in3" 20 12 367 In 7'" 106 399 9N 76 1431 _� .._.�..... to _ Al a to 22 W 310.000 ,9 st4."9._. _-- I 9 22 II 12 As 1 39 42 21 $15.0m Ill S2,13"_-1 a 74 54 is ml 33 m 523.000 m SSr.>r ____-_._____-____ 67 ICA N 74 169 T 69 125 Mom ro 349.999----------------------------- i 0 007 SA 4I 9S 59 135 7a 10 160 / 271 59i 15 v ................................. I t59 tOZ 32 15 4 499.9 ne6 e9s. w Ivn 6n.. me @ 1 4•• ..._.__ !1 1 7pv 6 a 3.7 j 4 2 r.9.. 60 w 7"" B." 4ir4 209 104 113 ---- .1 L9t 16 $3 000--------------------- v 7 `3 60 539 SA r Iw 1u 142 13Aa $$.0001, $T.nv -- -- - - ------- --. s is 47 17 71 16 ap 31 u S10.0m 9. S14 999 ----'-•----- L 71 59 ]D $I5.0a010 $24.999.---- ........................ ,: i3 iW .l 62 - 47 _ 14 $25.000 to 331,9... .....................«.«. 36 16 ! s - - - 72 02 - :6d 199 133.000 a �9--- __-_----------- -«_ 73 21 39 - b 5 :4 34 i•. m t w .110 nw% a 19x9 t9w. 99 "1, ww: I 10 0 1r.0 19.7 23.4 27.6 10.1 17.5 _ .10 23 J. -yd. 63 19 74 ,�' ----- - -- - - - -- ,w 1.ew SS.oW-----------------------•---- i 70 .4A ;9 sic 9 a0 % 1 s1a m 30a Tn H1 :90 3 334 s5.o00 re 59.999 _---___------------._ 2: 30 31 A Ill - 7 - a Is 44 v � SIO.WO to 114.999 x 121 AS 32 122 -a 39 54 71 2 511000 ro SU.999 •07 3A5 Im 76 A96 -!W- 764 7a 33 r1 325.030 w 33x,999 95 'An c1 n 322 11 Ila 153 21 baa 123 Its 7• 3 zw IA 97 133 13 199 a0) 56 III 3 262 24 IY 3w _ Pe cm i wo" . 1989 !w o.vn 4911 __`- 1.3 3.1 5.5 1.7 34 - 4.0 t03 290 9 ; herr 65 s 14 rmn Mit i. 6" 417 612 6A 1 in H 379 271 140 .. tax 1.iS.000_ -_-__-- ss ,= To $9M ............................... 31 74 /i 90 )• - 27 -"-&Ill e 739 7 V I6 1y Ill 123 473 SIQ.aW a Ila 9....... .. . ........... +0 64 � iia �T� I35 l50 10 106 a 676 - $1S.= 4 . 1219...................... ......., 13a 132 i69 . «'12 - 131 $a $25.3.9roS3a to ----- .__------ _----- -_. 56 J7 DT la r S35.a000. 4._------- ---------._ I :as Z7 16 - N e6 16 hrtw► w :vw . 1900 Or. a..eti tiv -__ 116 73 0 149 17 2 23.3 41.5 4.6 IJ 5 17 6 arw�i��. 6relee. 11..9asAr >3 T4474 los Ila SSAW _ __-_ 4O 9 3= 7 in 15 :7 in 33 17 07 16 1x72 _ ^_ g 40 e7 _ 92 - 15 10 74 - 36 16400 73 76 1! 310.000 ro SIA.999 �_1 M 94 K 7 102 1 41 e3 16 271. 215.000 16 $24.099--------------- ..... 60 133 49 _ 176 le 1" 6e 11 225.300 In SA9.999 - 113 A6 3A 7 129 5 11S 21 210 350.000 v 1.-. Ila :9 to a Ila 9 los SA lel h.w ..e .9a.w . 1989 bw. 99..1. 4-M -_ 37 2-3 6.4 - 10.9 so 4 S 14-5 its 7. p- 73 r- -d 60 YI Ya 33 1 4i/ p 1 399 m 136 1 HI ;Ar thn 45 As m - 309 24 157 114 11I $3.000 to $9.9. -_- 105 176 III 13 60 56 A7S N 53 1 095 510.000 IS 31A."T - 94 110 61 - 202 -� I61 9 e67 St5.000 4 32A,999 t74 74 e4 .1 233 - 22a 7 iZ 321x00 1534.999 33 67 _ Al ) ; m t 1 '71 533000.+1. ................................. 1u- 1"I 20 J a _ 156 _ _ •v hro.1 rr6 www w tat 1.I9.R$ b•d .«..... I 6.1 17.2 27.4 - 32.4 34.1 17.7 73-1 a6 is i SOCIAL ANO ECONOMIC CHARAC'ERIS-PCS FLORIDA 953 03.1)7 96 10:31 '1"`407 6:3 1091 t;. F. R. P. Question 32 was similar to the 1980 question, with a few changes. Pension income was distinguished from "other sources" for the first time, and income from estates and trusts was combined with the income from interest divi- dends, net rental income, and net royalties. Although some tables show earnings or other types of income, most deal with total income, Most common are figures on household income, derived by adding up the income of each person 15 years old and over in the household. Family income data also are presented lrequentty. Family income differs from household income because it excludes income received by any household members not related to the householder and omits per- sons living alone or in nonfamiily households. A few summary statistics are also presented for persons 15 years old and over. Income statistics generally are tabulated for income ranges (for example, the number of households with income in 1989 less than $5,000, $5,000 to S9.999, and so cn), with ranges becoming broader at higher income levels. in 1990 reports, the upper ranges are $50,000 to 574,999, $75,000 to $99,999, and $100,000 or more. 1n machine-readable products, they extend to $100,000 .to 5124,999, $125,000 to 5149,999, and 5150,000 or more. The same ranges are used in presenting data for house- holds, families, and nonfamily households. Median income figures are shown by selected characteristics, such as =amity type; and some mean and per capita figures are Shown. Poverty status is a derived measure that is determined by comparing the income of a family (or unrelated individ- ual) with the appropriate figure in a series of income thresholds. (See fig. 2-2.) If the particular income is below its threshold, the family (or unrelated individual) is classi- fied as below the poverty level. The thresholds, which vary according to the size of the family, the number of related children, and the age of the householder (for 1- and 2 - person households only), have been established as the standard Federal definition of poverty for statistical pur- -ases. The poverty thresholds are adjusted every year in accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index so that comparisons of poverty statistics between censuses are valid, even though both incomes and prices have been affected by inflation. The poverty status of unrelated individuals (persons living alone or who are unrelated to the householder) is determined independently on the basis of his or her own inccime. Poverty status is not determined for unrelated individuals under 15 years old or for persons living in college dormitories, military barracks, or institutions. income questions have been asked in each census since 1940. Limited data on poverty status were prepared from the 1960 census. Poverty data appeared in regular census report series for the first time with the 1970 census. HOUSING QUESTIONS Housing Unit A housing unit can be a house, an apartment, a group of rooms, a single room, a mobile home, a boat, or outer accommodations occupied as a separate living quarters or, if vacant, intended for occupancy as separate Fining quarters. Separate living quarters are those in which the occupants live and eat separately from arty other person in the building and which have direct access from outside the building through a common hall. The occupants may be a single family, one person living alone, two or more unre- lated persons who share living arrangements, and so forth. Both occupied and vacant housing units are included in Me housing inventory, except boats. tents, vans, mobile homes on sales lots, and the like are included only if they are occupied. Vacant units still under construction, burned out or otherwise open to the elements, and nonresidential buildings are not considered to be housing units. Living quarters containing nine or more persons unre- lated to the person in charge are not counted in the housing inventory. They are considered group quarters. Figure 2-2_ Poverty Thresholds in 1989 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 Years _ Size of Family Unit weighted average mresri- Related c hadren under 18 years 1 I Hgnt or olds Nane ! coal Two I Three Four Five Six Seven more ;,n_ parson (unrelated individual). $6.310 l:zder 65 yeas .............. 6 451 56.451 I 55 years and over........... 5.9x71l 5.9471 j '40 persons ................... 8.076f Householder under 55 years... 8.343 8,303 56,547 "ousahclder 65 years and over ............... .. . ..... 7,55,71 7,495 8.515 1 'nree persons ................. 9,885 9.699 91981 $9.990 1 1 1 1%6r persons ................. 12.674 12.790 12,989 12,575 S12,619 �e persons ................... 14,990 15,424 17,7x0 15.848 17,811 15,169 17,444 14,798 17,092 $14,572 16,569 516.259 S,x persons ......... . .......... Seven persons ......... . ....... 16.921 19.162 20.412 20,540 20.101 19,794 19224 18.558 S17,82B yrt persona .......... 21.328 22 330 23.031 22.617 22.253 21,738 21,084 25,719 20,403 25.089 520.230 24,933 323.973 ;ire or more persons . _ _ ...... 25.480 27,4831 27.586 27,229 26,921 26.415 16 OUEST)ONS ASKED 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING --GUIDE 07 :i_3 L064 .v. ` F- 3I--15rc 15:47 CF,C1jS Fi.FZE:-�j hL DIUT I I U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS TidMEINGTON, D.C. 20233 WEIGHTED AVERAGE POVERTY THRESHOLDS IN 1994 Size of family unit Threshold 1 person (unrelated individual) ......... $ 7,547 Under 65 years ........................ 7,710 65 years and over ..................... 7,108 2 persons ................................ $ 9,661 Householder under -.65 years ............ 9,976 Householder 65 years and over ......... 8,967 3 persons ............................... $ 11,921 4 persons ............................... 15,141 5 persons ................................. 17,90C 6 persons ............................... 20,235 7 persons ............................... 22,923 8 persons ............................... 2-5,427 9 pe=sons or more ....................... 30,300 If you have any -questions concerning these pcverty thresholds, please call (301) 763-8578. 4 003 P.02 October 1995 E i - —GZ.� eCC�'J .;� • mi� (---Nsus a.cEyi� }Y' 1 '� a ii 1 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20233 PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF POVERTY THRESHOLDS IN 1395 Size of Family unit Estimat4d Threshold 1 person (unrelated individual).. $ 7,-761 Under 65. years ................ 7,929 65 years and over ............. 7,309 2 persons ..................... S 9,935 Householder under 65 years .... 10,259 Householder 65 years and over 9,221 3 persons ....................... $ 12,256 4 persons ....................... 15,570 5 persons 18,407 6 persons 20,808 7 persons ......... 23,573 e persons 26,148 9 persons or more ............... 31,159 These average poverty thresholds were derived by increasing the 1994 thresholds by a factcr of 1.02834 which reflects the percent change in the average annual Consumer Price Index between 1994 and 1995. These estimates may differ by a few dollars from the thresholds that will be published in the final report on the 1995 poverty population. fa. ZZ 4j0OL 1f you have any questions concerning these poverty thresholds, mlease call (301) 763-8578. February 1, 1996 iCTAL F.03