HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-10-2010 Canvassing/Audit Board Agenda
OCOEE CANVASSING BOARD /AUDIT TEAM
Orange County Supervisor of Elections
119 West Kaley Avenue, Orlando, FL
March 10,2010 AGENDA 12:00 NOON
CALL TO ORDER
Board Members: Commissioner Keller, Commissioner Wilsen, Mayor Vandergrift
Audit Team: Deputy City Clerk Sibbitt, Executive Assistant Vyka
Others Present: City Clerk Eikenberry, City Attorney Rosenthal
Recording Secretary: Municipal Records Coordinator Moseley
CANVASSING OF ABSENTEE BALLOTS
BRIEFING. Public in attendance should be briefed on process as described in the following procedures.
REVIEW QUESTIONABLE ABSENTEE BALLOTS. Canvassing Board should begin reviewing the
absentee ballots that were set aside as questionable by the Supervisor of Elections Office. Any ballots
rejected by the canvassing board should have “REJECTED” written on the Voter Certificate envelope and
set aside. The “ACCEPTED” ballots will be placed with the regular absentee ballots.
LOGIC AND ACCURACY TEST PERFORMED. At the same time the Canvassing board reviews
questionable absentee ballots, the staff member assigned by the Supervisor of Elections office will
conduct the Pre Logic and Accuracy test of the tabulator as prescribed in Florida Statute 101.56(3).
OPEN ABSENTEE BALLOTS. The Canvassing Board may also authorize the opening of accepted
absentees during these procedures. Absentee ballots should be opened in the following manner:
All Voter Certificate Envelopes are opened
Only after ALL are opened, the secrecy folder with the ballot inside is removed, do not remove
ballots from the Secrecy folders until ALL have been removed from the Voter Certificate
envelope.
After all have been removed from the Voter Certificate envelopes and they have been placed in a
secure area, the ballots may NOW be removed from their secrecy envelope.
Ballots should be unfolded and laid out as flat as possible for feeding into the tabulator.
PRE LOGIC AND ACCURACY TEST & ZERO TAPE. When the Logic and Accuracy test is complete,
the Supervisor of Elections staff member will remove the test results tape, write on the tape “Pre-logic &
Accuracy test tape” and run a zero tape to begin the absentee ballot counting process.
PROCESSING THE ABSENTEE BALLOTS (through the tabulator). The Canvassing board may
authorize the processing of the accepted absentees at this time, which would include any questionable
ballots that are now accepted by the Canvassing Board.
►Note: Audit Team Members should not be present while totals are
being processed.
City Commission Regular 2 of 5
January 6, 2009
DUPLICATING BALLOTS REJECTED BY THE TABULATOR. Any ballots rejected by the tabulator
MUST be duplicated, regardless if they are over-voted or blank, pursuant to 101.56114(5). Ballots should
be duplicated in the following manner:
A team of two canvassing Board members make up the duplication team. One of the team
members is assigned to read the rejected ballots; one is assigned to create duplicates of the
rejected ballots.
Each rejected ballot will be marked with an “O” (original) and a sequential number i.e. O1, O2,
etc. The ballot being duplicated will be marked with a “D” (duplication) and the corresponding
number matching the rejected ballot, i.e.: D1, D2, etc.
stnd
1 Team Member then reads the votes marked on the original rejected ballot to the 2 Team
member who will, using an official ballot pen provided in the absentee packet, mark the blank
ballot duplicating the original voter’s intent. This process is done even if a ballot is blank or
over-voted
PROCESSING DUPLICATED BALLOTS. After ALL rejected ballots have been duplicated, numbers
are verified, and making sure the same number of the rejected original ballots marked with an “O” equals
the number of the duplicated ballots marked with a “D”. Duplicated ballots may now be processed
through the tabulator. All duplicated, over-voted, and blank ballots will again be rejected by the
tabulator, however at this time they may now be over-ridden by the machine (by pressing the 3 button at
the back of the tabulator).
PRINT ABSENTEE RESULTS TAPE. Once ALL absentee ballots have been processed through the
tabulator, the Canvassing Board authorizes totals printed. Once this tape has finished printing it should
be removed from the tabulator and “absentee results tape” should be written on the tape.
TOTALS SPREADSHEET. Totals from this tape should be added to the Totals Spread sheet. Totals
from Precincts(s), Early Voting, and absentees should now be added together.
CHECK PERCENTILES FOR POSSIBLE RECOUNT. At this time percentiles should be checked for
any races that are close, any results totals where the winner and second place candidate are within one-
half of a percent or less would cause an automatic recount pursuant to 102.141(6). If a race appears to
meet the automatic recount criteria, STOP and call the Supervisor of Elections office. If no races are
within the recount criteria percentile, the Canvassing Board may continue with provisional ballots, if any.
PROVISIONALS. If there ARE provisional ballots, the Canvassing Board would have to vote to
continue the Canvassing Board Meeting to Friday, March 12, 2010, at noon, in accordance with FS
101.048(1), allowing the voter “the right to present written evidence supporting his or her eligibility to
vote to the Supervisor of Elections by not later than 5 p.m. on the second day following the election.”
Provisional Ballots will be held unopened until the meeting is reconvened on March 12, 2010. If a voter
is able to produce such evidence before March 11, 2010, at 5 p.m., these ballots must be counted using the
tabulator; they may NOT be hand counted.
If there are NO provisional ballots for the Canvassing Board to review, the Post Logic and Accuracy Test
should now be conducted by the Supervisor of Elections staff member. After the test is complete, results
tape should be removed and “Post Logic & Accuracy test tape” should be written on the tape.
CERTIFY THE ELECTION
If there are no outstanding or provisional ballots, the Canvassing Board may at this time vote to certify
the election and begin Post Election Certification Voting System Audit.
Page 2 of 5
City Commission Regular 3 of 5
January 6, 2009
POST ELECTION CERTIFICATION VOTING SYSTEM AUDIT
RANDOM SELECTION OF RACE AND PRECINCTS
(a) The board shall determine the method of random selection of the race and precincts to be audited.
The selection method must be done manually and independent of any software program, and on a
random basis using a uniform distribution in which all races have an equal change of being
selected and all precincts in which the selected race appears have an equal change of being
selected. Examples of such selection may include selection by drawing lots or by using a ten-
sided die. However, the election method should be done in a way that the public is assured that
all races as defined in the rule that appear on the ballot are included in the random selection of the
race, and that all precincts contain the selected race are included in the random selection of the
precinct.
1. The Board shall first randomly select a race from all available races on the ballots.
2. The Board shall next randomly select two percent of the precincts in which the selected
race appears. If two percent of the precincts equals less than a whole number, the number
of precincts to be audited shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
GENERAL PROCEDURES
A majority of the Board shall be present at all times until the manual audit is completed.
Prior to the beginning of the manual audit, the Board shall jointly review the rules and statutes governing
audit procedures. The Board shall also review the security procedures for manual audits (last paragraph)
The Board shall conduct the manual audit in a room large enough to accommodate the Board, the audit
team(s) and, if present, two public observers per audit team(s).
If the room is not large enough to accommodate all public observers present, the board shall provide for
the random selection of observers (by lottery draw) from among those present just prior to the beginning
of the manual audit. The observers shall be allowed to witness the audit team’s activities but may not
interfere with the proceedings. Departing observers may be replaced by other observers using another
lottery draw.
No person except the Board, an employee of the Supervisor of Elections or a member of an audit team
shall handle any ballot or ballot container or interfere or obstruct the orderly manual audit.
To the extent possible, the certified result from the selected race and precinct(s) to be audited shall not be
disclosed in advance to the audit teams.
SPECIFIC PROCEDURES-DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE BALLOTS.
1. The Board shall order the printing of one official copy of the ballot image report from each
machine to be audited. The ballot image shall constitute the ballot for purposed of the tally in
accordance with this subsection.
2. The Board shall differentiate among the voter’s various choices in the selected race by assigning
a distinct color code to each possible choice in that race.
3. The audit team shall highlight the voter’s choice on the ballot image report in accordance with the
assigned color code.
4. The audit team shall then tally the results and write the number of votes for each candidate or
issue choice on the Audit Team Worksheet for DRE Ballots (DS-DE 105A)
5. The audit team shall otherwise examine the ballot images and follow the procedures used under
Subsection 8 for tallying and recording the votes.
Page 3 of 5
City Commission Regular 4 of 5
January 6, 2009
SPECIFIC PROCEDURES-OPTICAL SCAN MACHINE BALLOTS
1. The manual audit shall include a tally of the selected race for the selected precinct or precincts of
ballots cast on Election Day and during the Early Voting period, absentee ballots (to include
absentee ballots cast by uniformed and overseas citizens), and provisional ballots.
2. The tally shall be of the marksense ballots (paper ballots) that were tabulated by the voting
system.
3. Ballots cast at the precinct on Election Day, early voted ballots, absentee ballots, and provisional
ballots for each precinct shall be audited separately.
4. In order to distinguish between errors attributable to improper marking of the ballot versus the
voting system tabulation error, each audit team shall examine a ballot and if in agreement, shall
place a ballot into one of the following stacks:
a. Ballots on which the voter overvoted in the selected race
b. Ballots on which the voter undervoted in the selected race
c. Ballots on which the voter marked the race in a manner that should have been read by the
voting machine
d. Ballots on which the voter marked the race in a manner that might not have been read by
the voting machine
5. The audit team shall sort the ballots there were stacked in section 4(c) above (Ballots on which
the voter marked the race in a manner that should have been read by the voting machine)
according to the voter’s choice in the selected race. For example, the ballots with votes for
Candidate A should be placed in one stack and Candidate B in another stack. The audit team
members shall then tally the number of ballots in each of those stacks and write the number of
votes for each candidate or issue choice in the specific race on the Audit Team Worksheet for
marksense Ballots (DS-DE 105B).
6. The audit team members shall also tally the number of ballots for each stack as separated in
section 4 and write the number of ballots in each stack on the Audit Team Worksheet for
marksense Ballots (DS-DE 105B).
7. The manual audit shall continue until completed. A recess may be called but procedures,
established by the Supervisor of Elections, for securing the tally results and ballots shall be
followed during recess.
RESULTS COMPILATION: The Board shall direct the Supervisor to print a report from the voting
system for the precincts selected which provides the group detail of the number of ballots for Election
Day, early voting, absentee, and provisional. The provisional number may be included in one of the other
numbers. This report will be what the board shall compare to the audit teams’ manual count. The report
shall not be provided to the audit team members.
After the audit team has finalized its tally, the Board shall compile the results and compare the manual
tally to the official vote totals for the selected race in the selected precinct(s).
If the manual tally and office vote totals match for that precinct, this result is to be listed on the
Precinct Summary form (DS-DE 106).
If the manual tally and official vote totals do not match, the Board shall direct a different audit
team, if available, to conduct a manual re-tally.
If the re-tally totals still do not match, the Board shall direct the audit team to review the paper
ballot tabulator printed tapes or reports for the number of ballots cast in the selected race and
precinct(s). If the number of ballots cast in the selected race from the printed tapes or reports does
not match the number of ballots audited, the canvassing board shall take the steps necessary to
resolve the discrepancy. If that tally and official totals still do not match, that manual tally and
difference are to be noted on the Precinct Summary form (DS-DE 106).
Page 4 of 5
City Commission Regular 5 of 5
January 6, 2009
AUDIT REPORT: Within 15 days of the Audit, the Board shall submit its report to the Department of
State using the “Post Election Certification Audit Report (DS-DE 107) which shall be accompanied by a
completed Precinct Summary form (DS-DE 106) for each precinct audited.
SECURITY PROCEDURES: Each County Supervisor of Elections pursuant to its responsibility under
section 101.015 F.S. shall ensure that its security procedures include procedures relating to the security of
ballots, chain of custody controls, protocols for authorized access and secure storage of ballots that may
be used in a manual audit.
Page 5 of 5